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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
Defendant Steven J. Kadonsky appeals from the 
imposition of a $40,000 fine subsequent to pleading guilty 
to violating 31 U.S.C. S 5324(a)(3) (structuring money 
transactions in order to avoid statutory r eporting 
requirements). 
 
Kadonsky tendered evidence to the Probation Office and 
the Court tending to show that he was unable to pay, and 
not likely to become able to pay, a fine in any significant 
amount. This evidence indicated that Kadonsky alr eady 
owed the State of New Jersey $515,000 in unpaidfines. 
Over Kadonsky's objection, the District Court imposed a 
$40,000 fine based on the fact that he had two suits 
pending against the government in which the claims totaled 
$527,715. The Court did so without evaluating these claims 
and, accordingly, without making a deter mination as to 
whether it was more likely than not that Kadonsky would 
become able to pay the fine. Instead, the Court indicated 
that if it turned out that Kadonsky did not ultimately 
realize sufficient funds in this litigation to pay the fine, he 
could always return to court and secur e a reduction of the 
fine. 
 
We exercise plenary review with r espect to issues of law, 
including the issue of the legal sufficiency of a District 
Court's findings of fact. United States v. Mobley, 956 F.2d 
450, 451-52 (3d Cir. 1992); Gover nment of the Virgin 
Islands v. Davis, 43 F.3d 41, 44 (3d Cir . 1994). In the event 
legally adequate findings of fact are made r egarding a 
defendant's ability to pay a fine, we review those findings 
for clear error. United States v. Seale, 20 F.3d 1279, 1284 
(3d Cir. 1994). We will reverse and remand for resentencing. 
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I. 
 
Kadonsky's difficulties stem from his involvement in a 
nationwide marijuana network which he headed for mor e 
than four years. Kadonsky was convicted in a New Jersey 
state court of being the leader of this narcotics 
organization. As a result, he is curr ently serving a sentence 
of life imprisonment with a twenty-five year period of parole 
ineligibility. He was also ordered to pay a fine of $500,000 
and $5000 in penalties. Kadonsky owes an additional 
$10,000 fine in New Jersey stemming from a different 
conviction. Both of Kadonsky's New Jersey fines were 
imposed prior to his sentencing in the instant case. 
 
Subsequent to the New Jersey state proceedings, 
Kadonsky entered a guilty plea in the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey to one count of 
structuring monetary transactions by causing mor e than 
$200,000 to be deposited in amounts of less than $10,000, 
in violation of 31 U.S.C. S 5324(a)(3) and 18 U.S.C. S 2. 
Kadonsky was sentenced to twenty-four months in prison 
to run concurrently with the state prison sentence. As 
Kadonsky's federal imprisonment will end long befor e his 
state sentence, the federal sentence is effectively irrelevant 
to him. However, the District Court also imposed a fine of 
$40,000, and it is this fine which motivates Kadonsky's 
appeal. 
 
II. 
 
The PSR concluded that Kadonsky could not pay afine 
and was unlikely to become able to pay one. The 
government, however, sent a sentencing memorandum to 
the Court asking that a fine of $250,000 be imposed. While 
acknowledging that Kadonsky had no other assets, the 
government pointed to two lawsuits that he hadfiled 
against the government: "the Texas Lawsuit" and "the Utah 
Lawsuit." The government provided the Court with the 
following information concerning those lawsuits: 
 
        The lawsuits . . . are suits which seek the return of 
       money that was forfeited to the Government as being 
       the proceeds of drug transactions. In the T exas 
       Lawsuit, the defendant, in the first cause of action, 
 
                                3 
  
       admits that he transferred $125,000.00 to an 
       undercover agent in return for marihuana. Defendant 
       also admits, in the second cause of action, that he 
       instructed another individual to transport 
       approximately $50,000.00 from the New Y ork area to 
       Texas to purchase additional marihuana. After he was 
       arrested, the defendant informed authorities that the 
       second individual was transporting money to T exas to 
       purchase marihuana and the authorities appr ehended 
       this individual and seized the $50,893.00 he was 
       carrying. 
 
        In the third cause of action seeking r eturn of 
       forfeited money, the defendant alleges that he informed 
       an Assistant U.S. Attorney of the wher eabouts of a 
       substantial amount of money in the Dallas ar ea. 
       Undoubtedly, the defendant did this under the 
       auspices of cooperating with authorities. The way it 
       worked was that the defendant claimed that he was 
       aware of other drug dealers' activities and sometimes 
       would learn where they kept money or drugs. The 
       defendant would then put some of his own money or 
       drugs in a self storage unit and inform the authorities 
       of its whereabouts, claiming that it belonged to these 
       "other" drug dealers. Through this scheme, the 
       defendant attempted to, in effect, "buy" a motion for 
       leniency at his sentencing. . . . In the Texas Lawsuit, 
       the Defendant seeks the return of $225,893.00 
       claiming that he was not given notice of the for feiture. 
 
       * * * 
 
        In the Utah lawsuit, the defendant, pursuant to his 
       then cooperative efforts, informed agents of the U.S. 
       Customs Service that property had been pur chased in 
       Park City, Utah with the proceeds of drug distribution 
       activity. When the property was sold for appr oximately 
       $300,000.00, the Government forfeited the proceeds. 
       After the money was forfeited by the Gover nment, 
       Kadonsky claims to have "found out" that the property 
       was actually his and that perhaps it was not drug 
       money that was used to purchase the property. 
       Kadonsky was not given notice of the forfeitur e and 
       now claims, as he does in the Texas Lawsuit, that the 
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       forfeited money -- approximately $300,000.00 -- 
       should be returned to him. Thus, the defendant, 
       Kadonsky, is presently seeking in these two civil suits, 
       approximately $650,000.00. Were he to prevail in one 
       or both lawsuits, he would be well able to pay afine of 
       $250,000.00. 
 
Appellee's Supp. App. at 67, 68 (footnote omitted). 
 
The District Court was advised at the sentencing hearing 
that the court in the Texas Lawsuit had granted summary 
judgment in the government's favor, but that Kadonsky had 
filed an appeal. At that hearing, Kadonsky characterized 
the prospects of his winning the Utah Lawsuit as not "very 
promising." The District Court ultimately imposed a 
$40,000 fine. It explained its decision as follows: 
 
        Now, as to the fine, I have said that based upon the 
       assets declared by the Defendant, these lawsuits, it 
       appears that he has the ability to pay the fine if the 
       position he's taken these -- in these lawsuits is 
       sustained. It may well not be. If it is not, he can 
       certainly petition the Court for relief fr om all or part of 
       the fine after and if he loses these lawsuits at the trial 
       and Appellate level and there's a final judgment against 
       his position. 
 
Appellant's App. at 52. 
 
Two weeks later, the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah granted summary judgment to the 
government relying in part on Kadonsky's concession that 
he had told the government that the Park City property had 
been purchased using Weinthal's "drug money." Shortly 
after that defeat, Kadonsky reported it to the District Court 
in this case in a motion to vacate the $40,000 fine. The 
motion was denied. Six months later, Kadonsky lost his 
appeal from the Texas summary judgment. 
 
III. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 5E1.2(a) provides that "[t]he court shall impose 
a fine in all cases, except where the defendant establishes 
that he is unable to pay and is not likely to become able to 
pay any fine." As the Guideline text indicates, the defendant 
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has the burden of coming forward with evidence from which 
the Court could find it more likely than not that any fine 
would remain unpaid. The defendant "may meet that 
burden by an independent showing or by r eference to the 
PSR." United States v. Kassar, 47 F .3d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 
1995). If the defendant comes forward with such evidence, 
the Court may not impose a fine without makingfindings 
concerning the defendant's ability to pay it. United States v. 
Seale, 20 F.3d 1279, 1284 (3d Cir . 1994). The burden of 
persuasion is on the defendant to show that an inability to 
pay will be more likely than not. United States v. Torres, 
209 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
Where a sentencing court looks to the possibility of 
future income to satisfy the contemplated fine, it is crucial 
that the court take carefully into account the risk that such 
income will not in fact be realized. As we explained in 
Seale, where the District Court had r elied upon the 
prospect of royalties from the futur e publication of a book, 
careful analysis is mandated because curr ent federal law 
provides the defendant with no opportunity to seek an 
adjustment of the fine in the event the futur e income is not 
received. The cautionary counsel that we gave in Seale 
remains appropriate: 
 
        We note that careful, deliberate analysis on the 
       district court's part--concerning both its determination 
       of a future, hypothetical ability to pay afine and the 
       precise amount of the fine imposed--is crucial today, 
       since the amendment of 18 U.S.C. S 3573 in 1987. 
       Previously, section 3573 permitted a defendant to 
       petition the court to remit or modify a fine upon 
       demonstrating that he or she had made a good faith 
       effort to comply and that changed circumstances had 
       rendered the fine unwarranted. . . . Under the present 
       statutory scheme, this right no longer exists. Rather, 
       current section 3573 permits only the government to 
       petition for modification or remission of afine, and 
       only upon the basis of administrative efficacy. 
 
        The present statutory scheme severely hampers the 
       court's ability to leave itself a safety valve. 
 
Seale, 20 F.3d at 1286 n.8. 
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At the sentencing hearing, Kadonsky insisted that he 
could not pay a fine and was highly unlikely to become able 
to pay one. He pointed to the net worth statement he had 
provided to the Probation Office and to the PSR. The 
government's sole response was to point to the Texas and 
Utah Lawsuits. Accordingly, the sole issue for the District 
Court was whether the reliable information before it 
indicated that Kadonsky would more likely than not be 
unable to pay a $40,000 fine. 
 
We hold that the District Court committed two related 
errors of law. First, it erred in concluding that Kadonsky 
could come back and have a $40,000 fine reduced in the 
event the two lawsuits did not produce sufficient funds to 
pay both the New Jersey and federal fine. As we indicated 
in Seale, this remedy is not available to him. 
 
As a result of this first erroneous legal conclusion, the 
District Court found no occasion to evaluate -- or , as the 
Court put it, "handicap" -- the claims asserted in the two 
lawsuits. This, too, was an error of law. While it is, of 
course, true that some uncertainty necessarily attends 
placing a value or range of values on claims asserted in 
litigation, this is not a task that is foreign to district judges, 
and it is an essential prerequisite in situations of this kind 
to a factual finding on the issue of whether the defendant 
is likely to be able to pay the fine the Court is considering. 
Because the District Court believed that its fine would be 
subject to adjustment at any time, it accepted the face 
value of the claims without considering the infor mation 
before it bearing on the likelihood of Kadonsky's success. 
On remand, the District Court must consider that 
information and make a finding as to whether it is more 
likely than not that Kadonsky will be unable to pay any 
contemplated fine. 
 
IV. 
 
The judgment of the District Court will be r eversed, and 
this matter will be remanded to the District Court for 
resentencing only. 
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